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Introduction
If one were to construct a conceptual fram ework into which all criminal Jaw rules would fit,
what would it look like? The exercise requires a careful, sometimes judgmental, assessment
of what distinctions are most important to criminal law doctrine. These distinctions wi ll make
up the largest beams of the structure.
The result can be something enormously useful for organizing in one's own mind a large
collection of crim inal law rules, but also quite powerful, as an analytic device revealing
conceptual similarities and differences among doctrines that would not otherwise be evident.
And these interrelations among doctrines can influence how they are formulated and applied.
Knowing the rules governing the duress defence is one thing, but seeing the similarities in role
and function that duress shares with other disability excuses - such as insanity, involuntary
intoxication and immaturity - provides a new level of understanding, and a new set of
arguments regarding interpretation and formulat ion that would not have been apparent without
the conceptual framework. Part I presents writings that take up this framework challenge.
If one were constructing a criminal law, even if one had a conceptual framework worked out,
one would still need to decide how each doctrine within that framework was to be formulated.
Another volume in this series- The Theoretical and Philosophical Foundations of Criminal
Law, edited by David Dolinko - will do much to answer the form ulation question. This volume
addresses a more specific issue: What are the limits within which such doctrinal formulations
must operate? Beyond what boundaries can criminal Jaw rules not go? Specifically, Parts li
and III of this volume consider: What is the min imum that is sufficient for criminal liability?
And what is the minimum that is necessary for criminal liability?
The literature in this area is commonly organized around debates about 'morality
enforcement' and 'over-criminalization', including more focused conversations regarding
'regulatory offences' and ' preventive detention'. But we think these disputes raise important
issues that can best be elucidated by segregating the issues of offence conduct and offender
culpability. Thus, Parts II and lii of this volume explore the issues in this form: in Part II
we ask, what offence conduct, if any, ought to be necessary for criminal liability, and what
conduct ought to be sufficient? In Part lJI we ask, what offender culpability, if any, ought to
be necessary for criminal liability, and what culpability ought to be sufficient?

The Structure of Crim inal Law
Part I contains five essays that consider how best to construct a conceptual framework for
criminal law. (It is unfortunate that more scholars do not write on this fu ndamental topic.
The existing literature gives sparse choices, hence the unfortunate over-reliance on writings
by Paul H. Robinson.) Each essay touches on at least one of the three fundamental pillars of
criminal law doctrine: offence definitions, doctrines of imputation and general defences.
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The first pillar, offence definitions, has traditionally been subdivided into two separate
components: actus reus and mens rea. The distinction between these two concepts represents
one of the most basic organizing distinctions in criminal law today. Robinson, in Chapter I,
examines this distinction and ultimately recommends that it be abandoned.
The second pillar, doctrines of imputation, is systematically explored in the second essay
by Robinson (Chapter 2). While the rules and doctrines of imputation have rarely been
thought of as a fundamental conceptual category in the same league as offence definitions
and general defences, there are good reasons to think that they should be. Imputation rules
are essentially the reverse of general defences in that both represent opposite, but equally
important, exceptions to the paradigm of criminal liability. Just as general defences define the
conditions under which an actor will not be liable even though he satisfies the elements of an
offence, doctrines of imputation define the conditions under which an actor will be held liable
even though he does not satisfy the offence elements. In this sense, there is an organizational
elegance and symmetry to each pillar's interrelation with the other.
General defences, the third major pillar of criminal law doctrine, are taken up in Chapters
3 and 4. The major controversy in this area centres on the nature of justifications and their
relationship to excuses. Robinson, in Chapter 3, argues for an objective conception of
justification (the ' deeds theory'), which looks to whether the conduct is objectively justified
in the sense that it avoids a greater hann or evil and wou ld be desired or at least tolerated
were anyone to engage in such conduct under similar circumstances in the future. In contrast,
Kent Greenawalt argues in Chapter 4 for a subjective conception of justification (the 'reasons
theory'), which looks to the offender's reasons or motivation for acting. This approach puts
justifications as not too distinct from many excuse defences. (The subjective ' reasons' theory
ofjustification is the dominant view in the United States, but not in other countries.)
Chapter 5, again by Robinson, offers a different approach to constructing a conceptual
framework. It ignores many of the organizing distinctions used by the existing law today
and relies instead upon a new distinction that it argues is more foundational. It observes
that criminal law performs two quite different functions: it defines ex ante society's rules of
conduct- what people are prohibited, required or permitted to do on pain of criminal sanction.
Then, upon a violation of the rules of conduct, the criminal law shifts to a different function
of adjudicating ex post a violation to determine if the offender should suffer criminal liability
and punishment for it.
Most enlightening about organizing criminal law around this 'functional analysis' is the
doctrinal patterns it reveals. All doctrines serve one function or the other, and the division of
doctrines between the two functions does not follow the distinctions to which criminal law
traditionally gives importance. For example, some elements of an offence definition serve
the ex ante announcing-rules-of-conduct function, while other elements serve the ex post
adjudication function. Current doctrine makes no distinction between these two kinds of
offence elements, yet the difference is important, not only for its theoretical implications but
also for practical considerations as well. For example, the doctrines serving the two different
functions address two different audiences and logically call for different formulation and
drafting rules. The rules of conduct are addressed to society generally, while the principles of
adjudication are addressed to and implemented only by the decision-makers in the criminal
justice process.
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To give readers a little more background to help prepare them to get the most out of the
essays, we shall now provide a quick overview of what is to come in each of the essays in
Part I.
In Chapter I, 'Should the Criminal Law Abandon the Actus Reus-Mens Rea Distinction?',
Robinson argues that the actus reus-mens rea distinction is incoherent and should be
abandoned. For Robinson, what we refer to as actus reus requirements or as mens rea
requirements are in fact a collection of entirely distinct doctrines. Four doctrines typica1ly
described as actus reus requirements include the act requirement, substitutes for an act (that
is, an omission or possession), the voluntariness requirement and the objective elements
of an offence (that is, conduct, circumstance and result elements). Four doctrines typically
described as mens rea requirements include present-conduct intention, present-circumstance
culpability, future-result culpabiUty and future-conduct intention. While these doctrines are
commonly grouped together under the banner of actus reus or mens rea, the doctrines within
each group have no common characteristic and no common function. This inevitably creates
confusion and invites analytic error. The criminal law would be better off, says Robinson,
if it grouped these doctrines around its three primary functions: rule articulation, liability
assignment and grading.
In Chapter 2, 'Imputed Criminal Liability', Robinson offers a thorough analysis of the
doctrines of imputation, which he identifies as a distinct conceptual category of the same
importance as offence definitions and general defences. Just as general defences can exculpate
an actor who satisfies the offence elements, doctrines of imputation can inculpate an actor
who does not satisfy the elements. Robinson identifies four theories used to support imputed
liability. The 'causal theory' imputes liability to an actor who is causally responsible either
for the conduct of another or for the absence of a required state of mind in himself or another.
The 'equivalence theory' imputes liability to an actor who is thought to be as blameworthy
as one who satisfies the missing offence elements. The 'evidentiary theory' imputes offence
elements where proving them would simply be too difficult or too costly. The 'non-culpability
theory' imputes liability where doing so serves other societal interests thought to outweigh
the injustice of imposing liability on the blameless. Robinson then draws on these theories to
analyse, critique and gain insights into several specific doctrines of imputation.
In Chapter 3, taken from his book Structure and Function in Criminal Law, Robinson offers
a comprehensive analysis of the theory and structure of general defences. Organized best, says
Robinson, general defences come in three forms: justifications, excuses and non-exculpatory
defences. Justifications exculpate because the actor avoided a greater harm or evil. Excuses
exculpate because the actor is blameless for his admittedly harmful conduct. Non-exculpatory
defences exempt the offender from liability and punishment because, although he or she
has acted culpably and harmfully, exemption is said to further an interest more important
than punishing the offender at hand. There are two remaining ' defences'- absent element
and offence modification defences -but these are best characterized as part of the offence
definition.
Robinson then turns to the debate over the fundamental nature and theory of justification
defences. For him, conduct is justified where it in fact avoids a greater harm or evil ('objective
approach'), not simply where the actor reasonably believes that it does ('subjective approach').
The objective approach is preferable, says Robinson, for at least three reasons: it more
effectively announces how people should behave in the future, it provides a more coherent and

xiv

The Structure and Limits of Criminal Law

workable account of when defensive force may be used and it avoids the erroneous liability
results generated by a subjective approach.
ln 'Distinguishing Justifications from Excuses' (Chapter 4), Kent Greenawalt argues that
the law should not attempt to delineate bright-line distinctions between justification and
excuse, since, morally speaking, it simply cannot. True, he says, an act is justified if it was
the right thing to do in the circumstances, and an actor is excused if, though he did the wrong
thing, he cannot be blamed for it. But this superficial clarity masks much ambiguity and
complexity. What if elements of both justification and excuse inhere in the commission of
a prohibited act? How should we characterize individuals who act under a mistaken belief
about the existence ofjustifying circumstances? Greenawalt walks us through these and other
difficulties. In ordinary life, he concludes, our moral evaluations can cope with such problems.
The law, however, is a much blunter instrument. ln the end, its labels of justification and
excuse are simply too rigid and inflexible to track accurately our nuanced moral judgments. It
would be helpful if it could, since this would offer useful moral guidance to the community,
but the reality is that it simply cannot.
Finally, in 'A Functional Analysis of Criminal Law' (Chapter 5), Robinson suggests a
new way of analysing and organizing criminal law doctrine. This proposal would restructure
the existing system to reflect better the three primary functions of the criminal law: rule
articulation, liability assignment and grading. Rule articulation refers to the need for the
criminal law to announce the conduct that it prohibits or requires. The goal here is to offer
clear ex ante guidance to the community as to how they should behave. Liability assignment
assesses ex post whether the violation is sufficiently blameworthy to warrant the condemnation
of conviction. Grading assesses the relative seriousness of the offence, which is usually a
function of the relative blameworthiness of the offender, and which usually sets the general
amount of punishment to be imposed. According to Robinson, the current conceptual structure
of the criminal law uses distinctions that obscure each of these functions and that damage the
law's performance in each category. Criminal Jaw doctrines should therefore be reorganized
according to the particular function they serve.

The Limits of Criminal Law: Offence Conduct
Part 11 takes up the issues commonly referred to as 'morality enforcement' and 'overcriminalization'. We think it most useful to frame the issues with these specific questions:
What conduct ought to be sufficient to support criminal liability, and what conduct ought to
be necessary? The five essays in this section are arranged in chronological order so the reader
may get a sense of how the larger debate has developed over time.
Lord Devlin, in his classic debate with H.L.A. Hart, argued that the immorality of conduct
ought to be enough to justify crirninalization, with Hart arguing that the immorality ought to
be insufficient. (Hart's 'Immorality and Treason', reproduced here as Chapter 6, is not his most
complete writing on the subject but it is probably the most accessible.) In Chapter 8, Norval
Morris and Gordon Hawkins buttress Hart's philosophical arguments with practical arguments
against Lord Devlin's approach to morality enforcement. By all accounts Hart won this debate,
and it is now generally accepted that some actual harm to another ought to be required- the
so-called 'harm principle'.
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If the immorality of conduct is itself insufficient for criminal liability, is it then the case,
alternatively, that the harmfulness of conduct is sufficient? Many, such as Herbert L. Packer
(Chapter 7) argue that it is not. Packer argues that the conduct ought to be not only harmful
but also seen as condemnable by the community. (Robinson and Darley's 'Utility of Desert' in
Part IV offers empirical support for Packer's philosophical arguments on this point.)
Under this view, neither immorality nor harm is itself sufficient for criminal conduct; both
are necessary- at least 'immorality' in the sense of commanding a broad community sense
that the conduct is condemnable. It is not clear, however, that this view has carried the day.
While criminal law has been stripped of many of its pure immorality offences, it retains, and
indeed is expanding, its application to conduct that is harmful in some broad sense but hardly
condemnable, as in the enormous growth of 'regulatory offences'.
Indeed, as Bernard E. Harcourt makes clear in Chapter 9, the harm principle has been
stretched so far as to become almost meaningless. (Harcourt's essay is quite long but we
assure you it is worth the read.) Even conduct once thought of as pure morality enforcement,
such as prostitution, has been recast in terms of the harm it causes - to the prostitute, the
customer or society. With this ' collapse of the harm principle' in providing a meaningful
limitation on criminalization, Packer's demand that the conduct also be seen as condemnable
becomes an important limitation (if still ignored by many).
The debate over whether to adopt a harm principle has shifted to what the harm principle
should require; perhaps harm of a certain sort or level of seriousness? Chapter l 0 by Andrew
P. Simester and Andrew von Hirsch is an example of an approach that both refines the harm
principle and suggests supplements to it.
Again, we provide an overview of each of the pieces in Part II to help the reader get started.
In Chapter 6, 'Immorality and Treason', H.L.A. Hart responds to Lord Devlin's claim
that conduct can be criminalized simply because it is immoral. Devlin argued that a shared
morality is crucial to the existence of society, and that society is therefore entitled to protect
itself by enforcing that morality through the criminal law. Conduct is immoral enough to be
criminalized, according to Devlin, where the average person would view it with particularly
strong feelings of intolerance, indignation and disgust.
Hart's response is that feelings of this sort, however strongly experienced, must always
yield to logic and reason. We should subject our feelings to rational scrutiny, since they might
be based on ignorance or prejudice. We should also ask whether criminalization of particular
conduct is necessary to protect society from harm or, indeed, from moral disintegration.
Often, says Hart, it will not be. Much immoral conduct takes place in private, hurting no one.
And people are not likely to abandon their morality simply because some act of which they
disapprove is not punished by law.
Chapter 7, 'The Search for Limits: Law and Morals', is a chapter from Herbert L. Packer's
famous book The Limits ofthe Criminal Sanction. In it, Packer makes four main arguments.
First, conduct should be criminalized only if it is widely viewed as morally condemnable.
A different approach risks confusing the morality of the community and bringing the
criminal law generally into disrepute. It also threatens to prompt resistance and subversion
from key actors within the criminal justice system whose cooperation and acquiescence is
required for the system to function properly. Second, and echoing Hart, conduct should not
be criminalized simply because it is immoral: heterogeneous societies often disagree about
morality, liberty requires substantial individual freedom in the realm of morality, and several
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non-moral interests should be considered in determining the appropriate scope of the criminal
law. Third, conduct should be criminalized only if it is harmful to others. This is a useful
limiting principle because, while difficult to apply, it pushes us away from vague notions of
morality and forces us to identify and weigh the concrete bad effects whose prevention is
dependent on criminalization. Fourth, conduct should be cri minalized only where doing so is
likely to reduce the incidence of such conduct. General deterrence and incapacitation are the
most promising principles here, followed by specific deterrence. Rehabilitation, on the other
hand, should usually be ignored.
'The Overreach of the Criminal Law' (Chapter 8) is taken from the book The Honest
Politician :s- Guide to Crime Control, by Norval Morris and Gordon Hawkins. Its central
argument is that we have too much criminal law. And that this is a very bad thing. The
criminal law should generally focus on preventing harm to others. When it strays beyond this
remit, into the areas of morality and social welfare, it exceeds its proper limits at the cost of
neglecting its primary function. This results in a number of problems: gross inefficiencies,
wasteful spending, a diversion of resources from serious crime, an overburdened criminal
justice system, the emergence of black markets for popular but prohibited goods, injustice,
an increase in crime, contempt for the law, and discriminatory enforcement, along w ith other
forms of police abuse. Against this background, Morris and Hawkins argue for the abolition of
several offences that they see as both unnecessary and positively harmful to the criminal law.
In Chapter 9, 'The Collapse of the Harm Principle', Bernard E. Harcourt traces the hi story
of the harm principle, focusing particularly on the implications of its triumph over legal
moralism. This victory, he notes, has dramatically changed the landscape of the criminalization
debate. In earlier years, when criminalization was often urged entirely on moral grounds,
the harm principle served a clear and important limiting function. Now, in an era where
nearly everyone is persuaded by the need for harm, the harm principle has in a sense become
obsolete. Yes, harmfulness remains a prerequisite for the criminalization of most conduct. But
few are seriously disputing this. Indeed, nearly all arguments today - whether for or against
criminalization, whether conservative or progressive - are couched in the language of harm.
This is true even where the conduct in question has traditionally been categorized as a 'moral
offence'. Thus, the live issue now is not whether conduct will cause harm, but rather how
much it will cause, what type, and how to balance this harm against other competing interests.
On these questions, the harm principle has little to say. Accordingly, says Harcourt, a new set
of principles is needed to structure the modem criminalization debate.
In 'Rethinking the Offense Principle' (Chapter 10), Andrew P. Simester and Andrew von
Hirsch argue that the offence principle, as defined by Joel Feinberg, is incomplete. In particular,
they argue that, even after accounting for Feinberg's mediating principles, conduct should not
be criminalized simply because it causes affront - even serious affront - in others. Instead,
to be consistent with ordinary morality, to warrant the censure of criminal punishment and
to overcome the many reasons militating against criminalization, conduct must cause affront
and be both wrongful and harmful. Generally speaking, an act is wrongful if it manifests a
lack of consideration or respect for other persons. On the other hand, an act is harmful if it
involves the impairment of a person's opportunities or the frustration of his or her goals.
Even though this reconstruction of the offence principle would result in substantial overlap
with the harm principle, Simester and von Hirsch would nevertheless keep the two separate.
This is for two main reasons. First, each principle is structured differently, reflecting different
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emphases and differences in the balance of work done by the concepts of harm and wrong.
Second, while both principles require wrongdoing, the wrong required by the offence principle
takes a distinctly communicative form: it generally expresses a lack of respect and consideration
towards persons. This communicative element warrants special attention because it implicates
a number of powerful interests associated with free expression. We should be particularly
cautious about criminalizing these communicative acts because doing so tends not only to
censure and preclude the particular act that is proscribed and the way of life to which that act
gives expression, but also to undermine the actor's participation in society itself.

The Limits of Criminal Law: Offender Culpability
As the essays in Part II make clear, criminal liability should require that conduct be harmful
- even if only in some intangible and broad societal sense - and, some will argue, that the
conduct is also seen as condemnable by society. The essays in Part III take up the remaining
minimum requirements issue: What culpability, if any, must an offender have at the time of the
offence conduct to be criminally liable for it? Again, the essays are arranged in chronological
order to give a sense of the development of the larger debate, but we shall consider them here
in the order in which they come up in our analytic discussion.
The term 'culpability' has both a narrow and a broad meaning. In its narrow meaning, it
refers to the culpability requirements of an offence definition - was the defendant purposeful,
knowing, reckless or negligent (to use the common Model Penal Code terms) as to the objective
elements of the offence? But its broader meaning- the meaning used above where we frame
the topic of this Part - includes more than offence culpability requirements. It refers to the
ultimate issue of a defendant's overall blameworthiness, which requires additional inquiries,
beyond offence culpability requirements, including, for example, issues of the general excuse.
The defendant might well have acted intentionally, knowing all the facts that make his or her
conduct criminal, yet nonetheless be blameless for the offence because, for example, he or she
acted under duress, or under the compulsion of mental illness or involuntary intoxication, or
is too young to appreciate sufficiently the criminality or wrongfulness of the conduct. Perhaps
it is best for us to use the term 'blameworthiness' to refer to culpability in this broad sense
and the term 'culpability' only when we mean to refer to the culpability requirements of the
offence definition. In the essays below, however, writers will follow no such convention and
the reader will need to judge which meaning is intended by looking at its context.
For some of the writers here, the narrow- broad culpability distinction is critical. For
example, while there is no indication that he would ever do away with general excuse defences,
Richard A. Wasserstrom does think that, under some circumstances, there is at least a case
for abandoning culpability requirements. Retaining a concern for blameworthiness, he argues
only that strict liability is not as clearly in conflict with blameworthiness as people think, and
that tolerating any conflict that does exist may well promote other interests. Norval Morris, in
contrast, takes something of a reverse view. He would abo lish the general insanity excuse, but
continue to let mental illness negate an offence culpability requirement. (He too sees useful
interests advanced by adopting this compromise position.)
But most of the writers here support, or reject, culpability in both the narrow and the broad
sense. Lady Wootton (whose work is reviewed in H.L.A. Hart's piece) and Jay Campbell are
happy to do away with a blameworthiness requirement altogether. They are interested strictly
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in using the criminal law to restrain (or rehabilitate) dangerous offenders. Blameworthiness
plays no role in their behavioural control system, which is essentially a form of preventive
detention.
Hart, Fletcher and Kadish, on the other hand, are entirely committed to both culpability
and blameworthiness- they would demand offence culpability requirements and a fuJI set
of excuse defences as well as other blameworthiness doctrines. (Fletcher's essay seeks in
part to demonstrate how negligent culpability, properly formulated, is really a sound basis
for concluding that the offender is blameworthy.) It is not that these writers are unconcerned
about future crime, but they are simply not willing to allow the criminaljustice system to be the
mechanism used to avoid future crime by imposing the condemnation of criminal liability and
punishment in the absence of blameworthiness. (They might well permit a civil commitment
system to preventively detain the dangerously mentally ill offender, for example.)
Their commitment to blameworthiness is in large part deontological, derived from
philosophical principles, with practical arguments sometimes added for support. Robinson
and Darley, in contrast, offer an entirely consequentialist-based theory for requiring
blameworthiness - at least blameworthiness in the 'empirical desert' sense of what is
condemnable under principles derived from the community's shared judgments of justice.
They argue that legal rules that track community views give the criminal law greater moral
credibility, which translates into greater crime-control effectiveness. Rules that conflict with
community views, as with the systems that Wootton and Campbell support, would undermine
the criminal law's moral credibility, and thereby its crime-control effectiveness.
In the final essay in Part III, Robinson takes up the interesting problem of an excuse for an
offender's 'rotten social background', which presents something of a special challenge for
those supporting the blameworthiness requirement. Morris argues against the insanity defence,
in part, because he thinks insanity cannot be meaningfully distinguished from cases of 'gross
social adversity', but nearly all agree that such cases of social deprivation ought to be beyond
the reach of an excuse defence. As Kadish points out, such cases have not the breakdown of
rationality that other excusing conditions have. Nor do they have the breakdown of control.
While even those supporting a blameworthiness requirement would draw the line at an excuse
for social background, Robinson uses his utilitarian arguments for blameworthiness to step
over that line and provide an excuse for at least a subset of these cases.
The debate over blameworthiness as a minimum requirement for criminal liability has been
largely resolved in favour of the requirement, and more. There is much support for using
blameworthiness not only as a minimum requirement but also as the dominant distributive
principle. That is, many argue not only that a lack of blameworthiness should bar criminal
liability, but also that the extent of an offender's criminal liability and punishment ought
to depend upon the extent of that offender's blameworthiness. In 2007, the American Law
Institute's Model Penal Code, which is the model upon which three-quarters of US states base
their criminal codes in part, was amended for the first time since its enactment in 1962 to set
an offender 's blameworthiness as an inviolable distributive principle. Under the new code
provision, j udges may look to the classic coercive crime-control mechanisms of incapacitation,
rehabilitation and general deterrence, among others, only within the constraint of the offender's
blameworthiness. A sentence may never conflict with what the offender deserves.
lt is unclear whether the Model Code's commitment to blameworth iness will bring change
to those states that do not already take this view. And there is not the same level of commitment
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to the principle of desert in Europe. On the other hand, while it may not be accepted that desert
should control the amount of liability and punishment, it is probably now the prevailing view
in both the United States and Europe that, at a minimum, some blameworthiness is required
before criminal liability and punishment may be imposed.
We again summarize the essays in this section to help readers get started in their analysis.
In Chapter 11, ' Strict Liability in the Criminal Law', Richard A. Wasserstrom offers a tentative
defence of strict liability. At the very least, he says, it is not as clearly evi l as many suggest. This
is so for two main reasons. First, strict liability offers significant deterrent value. People have
reason to be particularly careful when they know that any mistake, however accidental, may
result in criminal liability. Indeed, where people have reason to doubt their capacity to avoid a
prohibited hann, strict liability may deter them from engaging in certain dangerous activities
at all. To the extent this results in both socially useful deterrence and socially harmful overdeterrence, we need simply conduct a cost-benefit calculation. Sometimes this calculation will
call for the rejection of strict liability. But sometimes it will not. Second, strict liability is not
clearly inconsistent with community standards and, indeed, there is a sense in which many
strict liability offences do involve some fau lt. Elected officials continue to enact strict liability
statutes without significant public outcry, and strict liability seems to have much in common
with negligence, which is a common standard of criminal culpability.
We also incl ude a review, by H.L.A. Hart, of Lady Wootton's famous book Crime and
the Criminal Law (Chapter 12). Wootton had argued for the total abolition of the mens rea
requirement. In her view, the need for mens rea is inconsistent with the (sole) preventive
purpose of the criminal law, since it forces us to ignore a whole range of obviously harmful
acts. Moreover, blameworthiness assessments are ultimately out of reach, since it is simply
not possible to know whether a harm-doer could have done other than he or she did. Thus,
under Wootton 's system, liability would follow simply upon proof that the defendant engaged
in prohibited conduct. The defendant's mental state might well be relevant at sentencing, but
only insofar as it casts light on the best way to prevent him or her from committing future
harms.
Hart criticizes Wootton 's proposal on several grounds. First, even assuming that prevention
is the dominant purpose of the criminal law, we may nevertheless pursue that purpose subject
to appropriate constraints. Considerations of justice and fairness to the defendant represent
one such constraint, and these considerations are captured well by the mens rea requirement.
Second, abolition of the mens rea requirement would dramatically underm ine individual
freedom and the predictabi lity of ordinary life, since potential governmental interference
would lurk around every comer. Life is full of accidental harmful acts that, under Wootton 's
system, would always be subject to investigation and preventive action. Third, elimination of
the mens rea requirement would undermine the stigma of criminal conviction. Convictions
would come to say nothing about a person's blameworthiness. And this would significantly
damage the nonn ative crime-control power of the criminal law. Fourth, some socially harmful
acts (like criminal attempts) seem, as a matter of definition, to require a mental element.
In ' A Strict Accountability Approach to Cr iminal Responsibility' (Chapter 13), Jay
Campbell also argues for a criminal justice system based entirely on incapacitation and
rehabilitation of the dangerous. This approach, like Wootton's, would do away with the mens
rea requirement; only a (materially) harmful act would be required for the imposition of
criminal liability. Campbell takes this approach because mens rea gets in the way of social
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protection and because the fault-finding function of mens rea is really a sham- most criminals
are simply sick or lack the freedom of choice required to warrant moral condemnation.
Sanford H. Kadish argues, in Chapter 14, 'The Decline of Innocence', that the criminal
law ought to retain both the insanity defence and the mens rea requirement. As to the
former, he concedes that administrative difficulties have often bedevilled the defence, but
thinks improvement - not abol ition - is the answer. This is true for several reasons, but most
importantly because the defence is necessary to protect the morally innocent from conviction.
The mens rea requirement should be retained, says Kadish, for the same reason but also
because abolition would run counter to deeply entrenched notions of responsibility and
morality, because blame and punishment help reinforce law-abidingness, and because the
mens rea requirement protects individuals from excessive and unfair government interference.
In Chapter 15, 'The Theory of Criminal Negligence: A Comparative Analysis', George P.
Fletcher argues that negligence is a proper basis for criminal culpability. He makes several
points along the way. First, mens rea refers not to a specific subjective mental state but to the
actor 's moral blameworthiness. This follows from the purpose of the mens rea requirement,
which is to ensure that only the blameworthy are subject to condemnation and punishment.
Second, those who argue that negligence is not culpable because culpability requires a choice
to do hann must explain why a choice to violate the law is not required in addition to a choice
to cause harm. Fletcher is doubtful that they can do this. If they cannot, this undermines
the primacy of choice and renders negligence at least potentially culpable. Third, negligence
is in fact culpable because, when circumstances give the actor reason to think his conduct
risks harm to another, his failure to apprise himself of such risks is blameworthy. Fourth,
the legality-<;ulpability distinction in German and Soviet law casts much light on the proper
conceptual structure of negligence. In particular, it suggests that defendants must be negligent
with respect to both the risk of harm and the risk of illegality attendant on their conduct, that
negligence is not an unusually vague standard of liability, and that the negligence standard can
accommodate only certain characteristics of the defendant in assessing culpability.
In ' The Abolition of the Special Defense of Insanity' (Chapter 16), Norval Morris argues
for the abolition of the insanity defence on at least three grounds. First, the insanity defence
requires us to make determinations that are simply beyond our current capacity. Second, the
defence's rationale is overbroad. It purports to exculpate those who lacked substantial capacity
to avoid committing the crime. But, taken to its logical conclusion, this reasoning would surely
demand the avai lability of other defences like 'gross social adversity'. The latter condition is
likely more criminogenic than mental illness, and yet we do not (and should not) allow it as a
defence. Third, while exculpation might well be appropriate where there is a total absence of
free choice, this is not the typical insanity case and, indeed, will arise only exceptionally, if at
all. The best way to proceed, says Morris, is to admit evidence of mental illness only on the
issues of actus reus and mens rea (excluding negligence), and at sentencing.
Sanford H. Kadish, in Chapter 17, ' Excusing Crime' , explores the structure and proper
scope of excuses. As to structure, be suggests that alJ currently recognized excuses fit into one
of three categories: involuntariness, reasonable deficiency or non-responsibility. He further
suggests that the unifying element of these categories is a lack of genuine voluntarism that
shields the actor from moral blame. Kadish concedes that legal departures from ordinary
morality might sometimes be justified in the face of compelling competing interests. But, he
says, if the law were true to everyday blaming practices, it would retain the defence of insanity
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and, indeed, recognize additional excuses based on reasonable mistake of fact or law. It would
also recognize a broader defence of duress. On the other hand, for both moral and practical
reasons, it would likely reject a defence based on the general incapacity to avoid committing
the crime. Nor would it recognize excuses based on social deprivation or addiction, since the
fonner does not involve a breakdown in rationality and judgment incompatible with moral
agency, and the latter typically involves fault on the part of the actor in causing his or her
addiction and, in any event, is inconsistent with the person-of-reasonable-firmness standard.
In 'The Utility of Desert' (Chapter 18), Paul H . Robinson and John M. Darley argue that
criminal liability and punishment should be distributed in accordance with societal notions
of justice. This promises to optimize the crime-control effectiveness of the criminal law
because by maximizing its moral credibility with the community, the criminal law is able
to (1) facilitate and communicate societal consensus on what is condemnable, and (2) gain
compliance in morally ambiguous cases through deference to its moral authority. All other
distributive principles are riddled with difficulties and, on balance, offer fewer crime-control
gains than a distribution based on the community's perception of desert. This is largely
because deviations from empirical desert are likely to undercut the moral credibi lity of the

criminal law and therefore its crime-control effectiveness.
Finally, in Chapter 19, 'Are We Responsible for Who We Are? The Challenge for Criminal
Law Theory in the Defenses of Coercive Indoctrination and "Rotten Social Background'",
Paul H. Robinson asks whether the criminal law should adopt excuses based on coercive
indoctrination and rotten social background. His answer: under an empirical desert distribution
of criminal liability and punishment, we should not grant an excuse based simply on rotten
social background, but we should grant a limited defence of coercive indoctrination which
might encompass some extreme cases of rotten social background. This follows from a
consideration of the (un)willingness of lay people to assign blame in various real-life cases.
The coercive crime-control distributive principles would not grant the defences because
their recognition would undermine deterrence and incapacitation goals. The same is true
of deontological desert and its traditional excuse theory, since the indoctrinated or socially
disadvantaged defendant lacks the requisite cognitive or control dysfunction at the time of
the offence.
Taken together> these essays offer a guide to the hugely important debate over the structure
and limits of criminal law. Both issues - how the criminal law should be conceptually
structured, and what limits it should operate within - represent significant challenges for
criminal law theory, and deserve serious attention. While, to date, the ' limits' question has
received more focus, we hope the 'structure ' issue will be considered more seriously by future
scholars.
Paul H. ROBINSON and Joshua Samuel BARTON
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